



Pearson

Mark scheme

Summer 2018

Pearson Edexcel
GCE History (9HI0/1E)
Advanced

Paper 1: Breadth study
with interpretations

Option 1E: Russia,
1917–91: from Lenin to
Yeltsin

Generic Level Descriptors: Sections A and B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

| Level | Mark | Descriptor |
|----------|--------------|---|
| | 0 | No rewardable material. |
| 1 | 1–3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision. |
| 2 | 4–7 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision. |
| 3 | 8–12 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision. |
| 4 | 13–16 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision. |
| 5 | 17–20 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision. |

Section C

Target: A03: Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

| Level | Mark | Descriptor |
|----------|--------------|--|
| | 0 | No rewardable material. |
| 1 | 1–3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.• Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the extracts.• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little or no supporting evidence. |
| 2 | 4–7 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.• Contextual knowledge is added to information from the extracts, but only to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.• A judgement is given, but with limited support and related to the extracts overall, rather than specific issues. |
| 3 | 8–12 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.• A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation. |
| 4 | 13–16 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by comparison of them.• Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth.• Discusses evidence provided in the extracts in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation. |
| 5 | 17–20 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.• Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.• Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate. |

Section A: Indicative content

| Question | Indicative content |
|----------|--|
| 1 | <p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally similar to Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24.</p> <p>The extent to which Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally similar to Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Both Lenin and Stalin used the purges to remove 'unreliable' elements from the party, and resorted to show trials of political opponents• Both Lenin and Stalin were prepared to use 'class war' terror tactics in order to ensure the survival of the communist regime, e.g. the Red Terror against the bourgeoisie in 1918 and the liquidation of the kulaks in the 1930s• Lenin established labour camps for oppositionists in the early 1920s and this was expanded into the gulag system under Stalin in the 1930s• Lenin created the communist secret police (the Cheka) to guarantee internal security from 1917 and Stalin expanded its role (as the NKVD) to safeguard the revolution in the 1930s. <p>The extent to which Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s was fundamentally different from Lenin's use of terror in the years 1918–24 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lenin's party purges were non-violent, involving the withdrawal of party cards; Stalin used terror at all levels inside the party which Lenin was against• Lenin would never have agreed to Stalin's show trials and executions of prominent Old Bolsheviks in the 1930s• Lenin's Red Terror launched in 1918 never reached the scale of Stalin's mass terror of the 1930s• Unlike Lenin, Stalin resorted to terror in the 1930s partly due to his pathologically suspicious personality and the need to maintain his narcissistic self-image as the 'hero of the revolution'. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p> |

| Question | Indicative content |
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| 2 | <p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how far the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1945–64.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the successes of Soviet economic policy outweighed the failures in the years 1945–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946–50) was remarkably successful in restoring the Soviet economy after the war, e.g. industrial production recovered quickly and urban living standards improved from 1948 • Under Khrushchev greater emphasis was placed on light industries which led to the wider availability of consumer goods which raised living standards for many Soviet citizens • Farming incomes doubled between 1952 and 1958 and, over the 1953–58 period, food production increased by 51 per cent • During the 1950s the Soviet economy's annual growth rate was 7.1 per cent (USA – 2.9 per cent). <p>Arguments and evidence that the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1945–64 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the immediate post-war period, Soviet agricultural production remained low, partly due to lack of manpower, e.g. in 1952 grain production was still below 1940 levels • The Liberman Plan, which attempted to boost the economy by decentralising economic decision-making and introducing market-based prices, was effectively shelved by conservative opponents in the Politburo • Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Scheme, introduced in 1954, experienced some serious setbacks, e.g. targets for grain production in Kazakhstan in 1959 were not met because the land was too dry and useful only for grazing • During this period, the military-industrial complex ignored or watered down economic initiatives which did not focus on the heavy or armament industries. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p> |

Section B: Indicative content

| Question | Indicative content |
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| 3 | <p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917–85.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Under Lenin, art and culture were expected to serve the political, social and economic objectives of the Soviet regime• For most of the Stalinist period, all artistic and cultural expression was expected to conform to Socialist Realism, i.e. conventional and idealised representations of life under socialism to serve as Soviet propaganda• Khrushchev, as leader of the USSR, also expected artists and writers to toe the government's official line, e.g. he banned Boris Pasternak's <i>Dr Zhivago</i> for its anti-Revolution content• The Brezhnev regime continued this policy by persecuting cultural and artistic nonconformity, e.g. the trials of Joseph Brodsky (1964) and Andrei Sinyavsky (1966), and the expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1974)• Andropov's government (1982–84) clamped down on popular culture by vetting rock groups prior to performance and restricting the output of songs not composed by official Soviet composers. <p>Arguments and evidence that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression did change in the years 1917–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Bolshevik government under Lenin permitted a certain amount of artistic and cultural freedom, e.g. 'fellow traveller' artists, the varied activities of <i>Proletkult</i>, and the promotion of the <i>avant-garde</i>• The last years of Stalin's leadership saw some relaxation in official attitudes, e.g. Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova gave public readings of their unorthodox poetry in 1946• Destalinisation in the 1950s encouraged a degree of artistic nonconformity and Khrushchev permitted the publication of previously banned books, e.g. works by Isaac Babel and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn• The Brezhnev and Andropov governments were unable to stem the influence of popular music on the younger generation, e.g. the emergence of guitar-poet Vladimir Vysotsky and the advent of the cassette recorder. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p> |

| Question | Indicative content |
|----------|---|
| 4 | <p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85.</p> <p>The significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since most Soviet citizens had a job, they benefited from real wage increases (50 per cent between 1967 and 1977) which contributed to greater stability by increasing savings and/or consumption • Stability was also promoted due to the low wage differentials among the working population which prevented social discontent over excessive inequality • The terms and conditions of employment for Soviet workers encouraged stability too, e.g. job security, a minimum wage (1956) and a shorter working week (1957) • For the vast majority, the state was their employer and means of promotion which encouraged loyalty to the system and thus stability, e.g. party membership increased from 6.9 million to 17 million in the years 1953–80. <p>The significance of other factors/ limited significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953–85 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full employment was no guarantee of contentment in the Soviet Union since many had undemanding, repetitive or essentially pointless jobs, e.g. annual labour turnover often reached 30 per cent • The extension of health care provision from the 1950s also had a stabilising effect since medical services were now readily available to the Soviet population, e.g. the spread of polyclinics and sanatoria • Soviet society was also improved by Khrushchev's extensive housing programme which increased the number of modern dwellings and offered better living conditions for many people • Between 1950 and 1980 state welfare spending increased by 500 per cent and the boost given to pensions, maternity benefits and the like also helped to stabilise society by addressing the issue of poverty. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p> |

Section C: Indicative content

| Question | Indicative content |
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| 5 | <p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution weakened the Communist Party's executive power and coordinating functions which created a political vacuum• Gorbachev attempted to fill this vacuum by creating the post of President of the USSR, but, this position had no clear chain of command, and, as it was unelected, it lacked legitimacy• As President, Gorbachev lacked the authority to deal with serious economic problems and nationalist tensions in 1990–91. <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Although <i>perestroika</i> stimulated some economic activity in the Soviet Union, it failed to ease the shortage of food and domestic goods• Removing controls on wages and prices was economically damaging since the result was rising inflation• Hampered by a Soviet mind-set, Gorbachev did not attempt to move to a market-based economy until August 1990 by which time it was too late to avert an economic crash. <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6 effectively ended the communist one party state and permitted other parties to be set up and contest elections – a process which rendered the CPSU powerless by the end of 1990 [Extract 1]• Gorbachev's position as President of the USSR was weak, particularly as he refused to base it on a popular election in 1990; Yeltsin, in contrast, used elections to build up his power against Gorbachev [Extract 1]• Gorbachev's political reforms, and his promotion of <i>glasnost</i>, failed to establish a popular consensus behind his modernisation programme and weakened the central government's hold over the republics [Extract 1]• Yeltsin's encouragement of the nationalist movements of the non-Russian republics was deliberately designed to undermine the political authority of both Gorbachev and the central Soviet government [Extract 1]. <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the</p> |

| Question | Indicative content |
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| | <p>consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic <i>perestroika</i> and the introduction of market mechanisms in 1987 undermined the unity of the USSR by failing to produce adequate supplies of food and consumer goods for the Soviet population [Extract 2] • Inflation led to rising prices and shortages of essential goods which forced Russians to queue for basic items and sharply depressed Soviet living standards [Extract 2] • Major divisions over the 500 Days Programme (1990), designed to move rapidly to a market-led economy, resulted in an economic collapse which further weakened the Soviet system [Extracts 1 and 2] • Economic <i>perestroika</i> weakened the Soviet planning system, provided little control (e.g. corrupt officials/organised crime undermined the cooperatives) and contributed to the economic crisis [Extract 1 and 2]. |
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